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Essay
The New Victims of the Old Anti-Catholicism
CHRISTOPHER C. LUND
Santayana once said that those who cannot remember the past are condemned
to repeat it, the implication being that we can avoid future mistakes by paying
better attention to past ones. Perhaps this is so. Or perhaps it is as George
Bernard Shaw once said-that we learn from history only that we learn nothing
from history. Yet one thing is surely clear. To the extent that modern injustices
have identifiable historical antecedents, we rightly stand doubly condemned for
them.
This Essay looks at four modern church-state cases which span the First
Amendment spectrum. The plaintiffs are religiously diverse-one is a Wiccan, one
is a Muslim, one is an evangelical Protestant, and one is an atheist.
Unsurprisingly, their claims find support in very different political communities.
But the plaintiffs in these cases all have certain things in common. They are all, in
their own ways, religious minorities. All of their legal cases were ultimately lost.
And, most importantly for the purposes of this Essay, each of their cases connects
deeply with the nineteenth-century history of Catholicism in this country.
In various ways, Catholics of the nineteenth century were mistreated by the
Protestant majority. The injustices they faced were sanctioned by courts as well
as legislatures, and legal rules were created to render their injuries both judicially
non-cognizable and socially invisible. These four modern plaintiffs are, in some
ways, latter-day Catholics. They suffer some of the same injuries; indeed, they are
sometimes inhibited by the very same legal doctrines created to repress the
Catholic minority over a century ago. One can think of these four plaintiffs as the
new Catholics-or, perhaps more accurately, as the new victims of the old anti-
Catholicism. As we struggle with our twenty-first century challenges of religious
pluralism, it helps to realize how much our struggles have in common with earlier
ones. Perhaps, armed with this knowledge, we can do a bit better now than our
forefathers did then.
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The New Victims of the Old Anti-Catholicism
CHRISTOPHER C. LUND*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade or so, there has been a surge of legal scholarship
looking at the history of anti-Catholicism in this country.' Legal
academics have plunged themselves into the nineteenth century to examine
the ardent conflicts between Protestants and Catholics of that era. And at
least some of this interest can be easily explained. For decades, the
Supreme Court took the position that government funds going to private
religious schools, even under evenhanded criteria, amounted to an
unconstitutional establishment of religion. But many felt differently.
Endeavoring to change both the mind of the Supreme Court and of the
general public, they turned to history, explaining how American political
and constitutional reluctance over funding religious schools actually had
deep roots in nineteenth-century anti-Catholicism. The normative
implications of much of this historical work were clear-the Supreme
Court's harsh stance against funding had a shameful history and therefore
was best abandoned.
Less attention has been paid, however, to the other ways in which this
history might have modem salience. And it turns out that a variety of other
modem church-state disputes also have antecedents in the nineteenth-
century struggles between Protestants and Catholics. Consider the
following disputes. A high school student in the state of Washington
receives a state scholarship for college, but loses it when the state
discovers he is an evangelical Protestant who will be majoring in
theology.2 An atheist objects to how his daughter's public school recites
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. I would like to thank Marc
DeGirolami, Chad Flanders, Rick Garnett, and Rob Vischer for conversations and comments on earlier
drafts.
'This footnote surely cannot provide an exhaustive list, but some fine works influenced this piece
heavily. See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM-AND
WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT (2005); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
(2002); Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins,
Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551 (2003); Steven K. Green,
"Bad History": The Lure of History in Establishment Clause Adjudication, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1717 (2006); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001); Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA.
L. REV. 117 (2000).
2 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715-17 (2004).
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the Pledge of Allegiance, with its assertion that this country is "one nation
under God."3 A Muslim police officer is fired from her job for wearing an
unobtrusive religious veil at work.4 A Wiccan minister is barred from
offering a prayer at a local county board meeting because the county insists
that only those of the Judeo-Christian tradition have the right to offer
prayers.5 These four cases have almost nothing to do with each other.
They raise radically different doctrinal issues; they find support in radically
different political comers. Yet the plaintiffs in these four cases all stand in
shoes worn earlier by nineteenth-century Catholics. Each of these modem
disputes is, in some ways, a replay of a clash from an earlier time. This
short Essay connects past with present, linking the struggles between
Catholics and Protestants in the nineteenth century with the struggles here
in the twenty-first.
Of course, profound differences separate the two eras and the two sets
of struggles. Astute readers might wonder why this Essay focuses so
heavily on the similarities but gives such short shrift to the differences.
The answer is simply that everyone can spot the differences. They are
obvious, even to those with little knowledge of history or legal doctrine.
The interesting point is how, despite all of the contrasts, a kernel of
similarity remains. Indeed, saying that two things are analogous itself
implies that they differ in significant ways-analogies are not
equivalences.
Having said this, an important difference between the two eras must be
flagged at the outset to avoid any misunderstanding. This Essay will
criticize the motives of some in the nineteenth century as being in some
ways anti-Catholic. But it certainly does not mean to impugn the motives
of people on either side of these debates today. Indeed, I myself have
defended (and litigated for) positions that I now criticize. This Essay
concerns itself with effects rather than motives. And from that angle, the
problems faced by religious minorities today do not look so different from
those faced by Catholics years ago. The struggles of yesteryear still have
something to teach us, both about the nature of our struggles over religious
diversity and about how to respond to them.
II. LOCKE v. DA VEY
For our first case, we turn to the Supreme Court's decision in Locke v.
Davey, which involved a high school student stripped of a college
scholarship from the state of Washington because of his decision to major
3 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2004).
4 Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 258 (3d Cir. 2009).
' Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 279-80 (4th Cir. 2005).
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in theology.6 But before discussing Davey, this Essay begins with a brief
account of some history that will inform the discussion of all four cases.
At the time of the founding, the nation was overwhelmingly Protestant
in character. In 1789, the country had about 35,000 Catholics, who
together made up less than one percent of the population.8 Catholics were
feared and disliked by Protestants, of course. But at the beginning, they
posed little threat to the Protestant consensus. And in the early decades
following the Founding, the country, if anything, became more Protestant.
Those decades saw a religious revival, known as the Second Great
Awakening; Methodists and Baptists in particular gained many new
members. 9
Yet as the nineteenth century progressed, things changed. The country
began to see significant numbers of Catholics immigrate from Ireland and
parts of Eastern Europe.'0 By 1840, over half a million Catholics lived in
America (3.3% of the population); by 1891, there were roughly eight
million (12.9%)." These Catholic immigrants differed religiously from the
native Protestant population. But they also differed in other important
ways-they tended to be poorer, more urban, less educated, and less likely
to speak English. 12 Thus began the notorious friction between Catholics
and Protestants that lasted throughout the nineteenth century and continued
deep into the twentieth.
One domain of particular conflict--one area where the two groups
could not easily avoid each other-was in the public schools. Organized
systems of public schools had begun to develop early in the nineteenth
century-before large numbers of Catholic immigrants started arriving.' 3
Protestants had expected that the public schools would provide some sort
of religious education for their children. But this created a problem.
Protestantism is not a denomination in itself. It is, instead, an umbrella
term for many of the religious groups that came out of the Reformation-
6 Davey, 540 U.S. at 717.
7 See, e.g., Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9, 111 (1868) ("'Our fathers were not only Christians; they
were, even in Maryland by a vast majority, elsewhere almost unanimously, Protestants."') (quoting 2
GEORGE BANCROFT, GEORGE BANCROFT'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 456 (1859)).
8 Heytens, supra note 1, at 135; see also Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 1, at 299 (providing similar
figures).
9 See SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 415-90 (1972)
(discussing the influence of the Second Great Awakening).
'o See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 1, at 300.
11 Heytens, supra note 1, at 135; see also Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 1, at 299-300 (providing
comparable numbers).
12 See Heytens, supra note 1, at 136 (citing JAMES HENNESEY, AMERICAN CATHOLICS: A
HISTORY OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES 184 (1981)).
13 See Ian Bartrum, The Political Origins of Secular Public Education: The New York School
Controversy, 1840-1842, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 267, 271-72 (2008) (discussing the origin of the
common school movement).
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Lutherans, Presbyterians, Methodists, Episcopalians, and so on. Early
public schools thus had to figure out how to provide religious instruction in
a way that would satisfy a very diverse coalition of Protestant groups.
1 4
The ultimate solution was a compromise. Schools would teach a general
least-common-denominator sort of Protestantism, which would avoid
discussion of any topics where Protestants disagreed with each other."5 In
this way, the early public schools had Bible readings, prayers, and hymns,
but simultaneously refused to allow more particularized kinds of religious
instruction. This became known as "nonsectarianism," and the
nonsectarian compromise satisfied Protestants of all stripes.16
But this compromise proved to be completely unsatisfactory to newly
arriving Catholic immigrants. For the prayers and hymns were Protestant
ones, and the Bible readings were from the King James Bible (which
Catholics rejected). 17 Indeed, in some sense, the defining feature of the
"nonsectarian" compromise was that it rejected Catholic religious
traditions-which makes a certain amount of sense, because one thing that
Protestant groups all shared was their common rejection of Catholicism.
To Catholics then, the "nonsectarian" compromise seemed little more than
a Protestant attempt to close ranks against them.
8
And as the Catholic population grew, they began to resist this
compromise. Catholics were numerically strongest in the cities, and so it
was there that they began to push for government funds for their own
schools. 19 Seeing this as a threat to the social fabric of their society,
Protestants responded with force. Perhaps the most notorious incident
came in New York in 1842. After the Catholic Bishop John Hughes
campaigned for state support for church schools, an angry mob destroyed
his home. Not pacified, the mob then threatened to raze St. Patrick's
Cathedral, and eventually the state militia had to intervene to keep the
peace. 0 Similar (though less dramatic) things happened in other cities as
14 See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 1, at 298; see also Bartrum, supra note 13, at 282-84.
15 See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 1, at 299 ("A generalized Protestantism became the common
religion of the common school."); see also David B. Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers: Religion in the
American Common School, in HISTORY AND EDUCATION: THE EDUCATIONAL USES OF THE PAST 212,
218 (Paul Nash ed., 1970) ("Most Protestant churches declared a truce with each other at the doors of
the common school.").
16 See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 1, at 299; Tyack, supra note 15, at 218.
17 See HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 220-21; see also Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 1, at 299-300.
18 Douglas Laycock, Comment, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious
Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REv. 155, 188 (2004).
19 See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 1, at 306-07.2
0 DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS: NEW YORK CITY, 1805-1973, A HISTORY OF THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS AS BATTLEFIELDS OF SOCIAL CHANGE 75 (1974); see also Bartrum, supra note 13, at
313-19.
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well.
2 1
Eventually, Protestant resistance to the funding of Catholic schools
formalized in what came to be known as the Blaine Amendment.
22
Proposed in 1875, the Blaine Amendment would have amended the federal
Constitution to prohibit individual states from giving funds to "sectarian"
(i.e., Catholic) schools. The Blaine Amendment narrowly failed in
Congress.23  But afterwards, many states added similar amendments to
their own constitutions, most of which still exist today.24 To be sure, not
all of these provisions were necessarily tainted by anti-Catholicism. And
even the tainted ones were likely the products of some legitimate concerns
as well. 25  But few doubt the serious role anti-Catholicism played in the
entire affair.26 When Justice Thomas recently remarked that "hostility to
aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree,, 27 he was
undoubtedly standing on solid historical ground.
Roughly 125 years after the federal Blaine Amendment failed, Joshua
Davey graduated from high school in the state of Washington. He sought
to take advantage of Washington's Promise Scholarship Program, which
had been created in 1999 to help deserving students from poor families
attend college.28 The scholarships could be used for full-time study at any
accredited Washington university, public or private, religious or not.
29
And they were generally available to all students satisfying the academic
21 See Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State
Constitutional Law, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657, 669 (1998) [hereinafter Viteritti, Blaine's Wake]
(discussing similar courses of events in Michigan, Minnesota, and Massachusetts); Joseph P. Viteritti,
The Inadequacy ofAdequacy Guarantees: A Historical Commentary on State Constitutional Provisions
That Are the Basis for School Finance Litigation, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 58,
78 (2007) [hereinafter Viteritti, The Inadequacy of Adequacy] (discussing a similar course of events in
Philadelphia).
22 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1876) (introduction of the Blaine Amendment).
23 A number of historical accounts provide details of these developments. See Steven K. Green,
The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 50 (1992); Marie Carolyn
Klinkhamer, The Blaine Amendment of 1875: Private Motives for Political Action, 42 CATH. HIST.
REV. 15, 15 (1956).
24 See, e.g., Sarah Barringer Gordon, "Free" Religion and "Captive" Schools: Protestants,
Catholics, and Education, 1945-1965, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1177, 1183 n.22 (2007) (putting the number
of active state Blaine Amendments at 37); Heytens, supra note 1, at 134 (putting the number at around
30).
25 E.g., Green, supra note 1, at 1740-44; Marc D. Stem, Blaine Amendments, Anti-Catholicism,
and Catholic Dogma, 2 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 153, 176 (2003).
26 See, e.g., Green, supra note i, at 1742-43 (arguing that "multiple interests influenced those
who supported the various versions of the Blaine Amendment," but also noting that "there is little
doubt that anti-Catholicism informed later applications of the nonsectarian principle and the larger
debate surrounding the Blaine Amendment").
27 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000).
28 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715-17 (2004); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 28B. 119.005-
050 (2006).29 Davey, 540 U.S. at 716; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.1 19.1 10(l)(a)(ii).
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and income requirements. But there was a statutory proviso-students
could not use the money to major in theology.30  Meeting all the other
requirements, Joshua Davey was awarded a scholarship. He attended
Northwest College, a university affiliated with the Assemblies of God,
double majoring in business administration and pastoral ministries. 31 But
the election of this second major, which was considered a degree in
theology, cost Davey his scholarship.32
Davey responded by filing suit, claiming that Washington had
religiously discriminated against him in violation of the Free Exercise
Clause.33  His claim had an airtight logic about it. The Free Exercise
Clause forbids religious discrimination.34  And this was religious
discrimination-the statute referred to religion on its face, barring theology
majors (and only theology majors) from funding.35 Yet the Supreme Court
found Davey's claim unpersuasive. Indeed, everything seemed to indicate
that the Court thought the case easy. The opinion was short and quite
terse; the Court was nearly unanimous; and the decision was issued quickly
and released long before the end of the term.36 Concluding that Davey did
not face any criminal charge or civil penalty, the Court held that he was not
sufficiently burdened by the Washington statute.37 While Davey could not
be fined orjailed for attending divinity school, he had no right to have the
government pay for his religious education.38
There are natural parallels between Joshua Davey's situation and that
of nineteenth-century Catholics. In Davey, the government was willing to
pay for a secular education but not a religious one. Those financial
incentives worked to pressure Davey away from his chosen religious
vocation in order to get the government's scholarship. With nineteenth-
century Catholics, the government was willing to pay for a Protestant
education but not a Catholic one. And those financial incentives worked to
pressure Catholics into having to endure the Protestant public schools.
30 Davey, 540 U.S. at 716; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 28B. 119.010(8).
31 Davey, 540 U.S. at 717.
32 id.
33 1d. at 718.
34 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)
(explaining that the state cannot "target[] religious conduct for distinctive treatment"); Emp't Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (explaining that the state cannot "impose special disabilities on the
basis of religious views or religious status").
35 See Laycock, supra note 18, at 172 (calling this "discrimination under any understanding of
discrimination").36 Christopher C. Lund, Of Government Funding, Religious Institutions, and Neutrality: Seeing
the Charitable-Choice Debate Through the Lens of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, 40 TULSA L. REV.
321,323 (2004).
37 Davey, 540 U.S. at 725.
3 See id. at 720-21 ("[Washington's program] imposes neither criminal nor civil
sanctions .... [I]t does not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a
government benefit.... The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.").
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There are differences between the two situations--one cannot expect
nineteenth-century history to line up perfectly with twenty-first-century
disputes. But both cases involve discriminatory financial incentives
pushing people away from their chosen religious commitments.
Besides the factual parallels, there is also a historical link. The Davey
Court itself drew this connection when it referred to the "historic and
substantial" state interests standing behind Washington's decision to
exclude theology majors from its scholarship program.3 9  Over the
preceding sixty years, the Court had decided more than twenty cases about
the public funding of private religious education-going back to the 1947
decision in Everson v. Board of Education,40 which first put constitutional
limits on the practice.41 The Court's twentieth-century opposition to such
funding was certainly informed by the nineteenth-century conflicts
between Catholics and Protestants on this issue. Consider Justice
Brennan's remark in the 1971 case of Lemon v. Kurtzman,42 when he
grounded his opposition to funding in that history: "[F]or more than a
century, the consensus, enforced by legislatures and courts with substantial
consistency, has been that public subsidy of sectarian schools constitutes
an impermissible involvement of secular with religious institutions. ' '43 All
this is to say that the funding dispute in Davey had a historical lineage
directly traceable to the nineteenth-century conflicts between Catholics and
Protestants. And the resolution of those nineteenth-century conflicts, by
Davey's time, had solidified into a social tradition and a legal precedent
that Joshua Davey could not overcome.
Indeed, the historical connection to these nineteenth-century funding
conflicts is even more pronounced in Davey's particular case. As
explained earlier, many states in the nineteenth century had passed Blaine
Amendments, some of which were stained by unjustified fears of
Catholicism. Washington's Blaine Amendment dates back to this period;
it had been passed in 1889.44 Some of Davey's amici argued that this
ancient Blaine Amendment unconstitutionally tainted Washington's 1999
decision to exclude theology majors from its scholarship program.45 The
Supreme Court sidestepped this claim, saying that it was not litigated
3 9 Id at 725.
40 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
41 Id. at 17 (upholding the provision of government-funded bus rides to students attending private
school).
42 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
43 Id. at 648-49 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
44 See Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676, 676-77 (enabling act for North Dakota,
Montana, South Dakota, and Washington) ("That provision shall be made for the establishment.., of
systems of public schools, which shall be ... free from sectarian control.").
45 See Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 29, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 713 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 22118852 at *29.
2012]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
below and that more evidence was needed. 6 This decision made some
sense. Even if Washington's Blaine Amendment was tainted by
unconstitutional anti-Catholicism, it would still be hard for Davey to
establish a causal link between the Blaine Amendment and the loss of his
scholarship--after all, even if Washington had never passed a Blaine
Amendment in 1889, it still might have chosen to exclude theology majors
in 1999.
47
Yet consider the larger issues of causation at play here. Consider what
would have happened without the nineteenth-century history of anti-
Catholicism in this country. Without it, we might never have had Everson;
we might never have had the early cases first prohibiting aid to religious
schools. Without this nineteenth-century history, perhaps the whole line of
Supreme Court cases restricting aid would never have happened. After all,
the no-aid cases are, in some ways, deep anomalies. There are no other
doctrinal areas where the Supreme Court tolerates rank discrimination
against religious individuals and groups-perhaps the only factually
analogous case is McDaniel v. Paty,4 which involved Tennessee laws
prohibiting clergy from being legislators and which the Supreme Court
struck down unanimously.49
Of course, this is indeed speculation of the rankest sort; it is impossible
to know how the twenty-first century would look if things had been
different in the nineteenth. But the larger point is that Davey and the
nineteenth-century disputes are deeply tied to each other, not only in terms
of doctrine and fact, but also in the sophisticated but uncertain web of
historical causation. And certainly when the Davey Court explained its
conclusion by referring to the longstanding tradition of not funding
religious entities-the Court's reference to the "historic and substantial
state interest" 50 involved-it suggests that what happened to Joshua Davey
is in part justified by what happened to the Catholics of a century ago, a
troubling conclusion indeed.
III. ELK GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT V. NEWDOW
As we have seen, nineteenth-century Protestants worked to deny
government funding to Catholic private schools. Yet there was a second
and complementary aspect to this effort. Just as they denied Catholics
funds for their own schools, Protestants also sought to keep their schools
dependably Protestant. As explained above, that meant Protestant Bible
readings, Protestant hymns, and Protestant prayers. And Catholics, quite
4See Davey, 540 U.S. at 723 n.7.
47 Laycock, supra note 18, at 189.
4435 U.S. 618 (1978).
41 Id. at 628-29.
'0 Davey, 540 U.S. at 725.
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understandably, found this arrangement unacceptable.
One can see the struggle perhaps most vividly in the fights over Bible
reading. Public schools arranged to have the King James Bible read by
itself-that is, without any interpretative notes or commentary. That was a
sensible compromise among Protestants, who could agree on the value of
reading the Bible without being able to agree on precisely what the Bible
meant. But that arrangement frustrated Catholics. Catholics rejected the
King James Bible, to be sure. But more fundamentally, they rejected the
very idea that the Bible was properly understood without commentary. For
Catholics, reading the Bible by itself was an error that Protestants made.
Indeed, it was the sort of error that in a way defined Protestantism-by
encouraging people to approach complicated issues without guidance,
Protestantism naturally led to individuals adopting dangerously
unpredictable and erroneous religious conclusions. So while Protestants
thought of their approach as a workable response to the problem of
increasing religious pluralism, Catholics saw it simply as a tool of
Protestant repression.5'
Just as Catholics sought government funding for their own schools,
they simultaneously worked to remove the most obvious signs of
Protestantism from the common public schools. Here too there was
trouble. Dissenting Catholic students faced individual hardships.
Sometimes they were expelled for disobedience;" sometimes they were
punished physically.5 3 When they dared to sue, reviewing courts usually
deferred to school administrators.54
On a wider level, these public school conflicts exacerbated tensions
between Protestant and Catholic communities. In Cincinnati, for example,
a group of Catholics-along with some Jews and Freethinkers-
successfully persuaded a school board to drop required Bible reading from
the public school curriculum. This caused a massive uproar that, one
historian notes, "plunged Cincinnati into a boiling cauldron of fear and
bigotry." 55  The local paper denounced the school board's action as
5' See, e.g., Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 1, at 300 ("Unaccompanied Bible reading, which was the
cornerstone of the Protestant consensus, was to Catholics an affront.").
52 See Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376, 379 (1854) (dismissing a claim brought by a Catholic
student expelled for refusing to read the King James Bible).
53 See Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. 417, 419, 425-26 (Mass. Police Ct. 1859)
(dismissing the prosecution of a public school teacher who beat a Catholic student for refusing to read
from the King James Bible and the Protestant version of the Ten Commandments).
54 One scholar concluded that that there were "twenty-five similar suits (fifteen by Catholics)
brought in nineteen States through 1925, only five of which resulted in favorable rulings for the
plaintiffs." Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 21, at 668.
" Harold M. Helfman, The Cincinnati 'Bible War,' 60 OHIO ST. ARCHAEOLOGICAL & HIST. Q.
369, 369 (1951).
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"hand[ing] the public schools over to Pope, Pagan, and Satan. 56
Protestant objectors filed suit and had the decision overturned. 7 And
sometimes when Catholics opposed the religious assimilation of the public
schools, there were deadly riots-as in Philadelphia, where Catholic
homes, churches, and seminaries were burned to the ground.5 8 In places
where Catholics were most numerous, they sometimes succeeded in getting
Bible reading removed from the public school curriculum. 59 On the whole,
however, they were not particularly successful; one scholar estimates that
seventy-five to eighty percent of school districts kept Bible reading in
some form.6°
Moving forward to the modem day, consider the case brought by
Michael Newdow, who had a daughter in the Elk Grove public school
system in California. Each day, her elementary school teacher led the class
in a group recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, part of which refers to
this country as being "one Nation under God."61 Objecting to the religious
dimension of the Pledge, Newdow brought suit and his case eventually
62
reached the Supreme Court. But the Court did not reach the merits of
Newdow's claim. Instead it concluded that Newdow, who was the child's
noncustodial parent and who had tenuous and uncertain parental rights
under California law, lacked standing to bring the suit.63 Three Justices
wrote separately, all concluding that they would have upheld the phrase
"under God" in the Pledge as constitutional.64 No Justice disputed that
conclusion.
Many have rightly recognized the connection between Joshua Davey's
story and nineteenth-century history, but few (if any) have written about
the link between Michael Newdow's story and that same history.
Catholics in the nineteenth century complained of having to endure a
foreign religion in the government-run public schools. That religion was
56 ROBERT MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL: TRENDS AND ISSUES IN THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOL IN THE UNITED STATES 118 (1970).
57 See Green, supra note 1, at 132. Similar decisions by school boards in Chicago and New York
led to similar controversies. See, e.g., Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 21, at 670.
58 See MARTIN E. MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR OwN LAND: 500 YEARS OF RELIGION IN AMERICA
275-76(1984).
59 See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 1, at 304 (noting that "New York City, Chicago, Buffalo, and
Rochester banned Bible reading in the public schools" and that "by the early twentieth century, a few
state courts had outlawed Bible reading and other religious observances in public school as violative of
state constitutions").
6 See, e.g., Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 21, at 667 (claiming that "between seventy-five
and eighty percent of the schools in the country voluntarily followed the practice" of Bible reading in
the public schools).
6' Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 7 (2004).
62 id
631Id. at 17.
64Id. at 18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 36-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 54
(Thomas, J., concurring).
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nondenominational in the sense of being agreeable to most Protestants, but
it was incompatible with Catholicism. This, of course, is essentially what
Newdow claimed with regard to the Pledge: while it might be
nondenominational in the sense of speaking generally about God in terms
that most monotheists would accept, it was incompatible with atheism,
agnosticism, and a number of other religions. In her opinion upholding the
Pledge, Justice O'Connor put great emphasis on its nonsectarian nature.
Only because the Pledge made no "reference to [any] particular religion"
and contained "minimal religious content" was it constitutional in her
eyes. 65 But this, of course, is precisely how nineteenth-century Protestants
defended Bible reading and hymn singing-as so lacking in divisive
theological content as to be unobjectionable. What we think of as divisive
theological content has changed in the past hundred years. But that is all
that seems to separate Newdow from his nineteenth-century Catholic
predecessors. Professor Joseph Viteritti once referred to the de facto
Protestantism in nineteenth-century public schools as "a telling story of the
risks incurred when a ruling majority is allowed to establish a monopoly
over the educational process and to impose its [religious] values upon
everyone else's children."6 That was well put and not too far from what
Michael Newdow meant when he called the Pledge "an example of the
majority using the machinery of the state to enforce its preferred religious
orthodoxy.., in the public schools. 67 In both instances, the government
has taken advantage of its control over the educational process to
religiously pressure a captive audience of schoolchildren.
IV. WEBB V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
A third aspect to the public school controversies between Protestants
and Catholics is one that has been almost completely forgotten today. In
addition to delicate questions over the funding of private schools and the
religious character of public schools, the growth of Catholicism also
introduced the question of what to do about teachers wearing religious
garb. That question arose one hundred and fifty years ago, and the
resolution reached then still enters into how we perceive the question
today.
During the nineteenth century, it was common for clergy to work as
school teachers. In his great study of America, de Tocqueville noted how
6 Id. at 42-43 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66 See Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 21, at 668.
67 Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 2, Newdow, 542 U.S. I (No. 02-1624), 2004 WL 314156 at
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"[a]lmost all education is entrusted to the clergy., 68  As the Catholic
population grew, it was thus entirely natural that Catholic priests and nuns
would begin to take positions teaching in the public schools. But that
disturbed Protestants, especially given the Catholic Church's insistence
that priests and nuns wear clothing reflecting their Catholicism.
69
Protestants feared that this would unduly influence public school children
toward Catholicism. And some Protestants surely realized that banning
religious garb would be a devastatingly effective way of keeping priests
and nuns out of the public schools and off the government's payroll.
Consider what happened in Pennsylvania. In 1894, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court offered some protection to the Catholic minority when it
rejected the claim that the employment of garbed Catholic nuns and priests
in the public schools itself violated the Pennsylvania state constitution.7 °
But this sparked an outcry from outraged Protestants-and a year later,
Pennsylvania passed a statute barring public school teachers from wearing
religious garb.71 Everyone now agrees that the statute was aimed at
Catholics and was the result of anti-Catholic prejudice.72 But unwilling to
get involved, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the statute when it
came under fire.73
What happened in Pennsylvania happened in other states around the
country, although the details understandably differed. Some states passed
statutes to bar religious garb.74 Some courts interpreted their own state
constitutions to bar religious garb, even without any statute.75 And some
68 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 320 n.4 (Francis Bowen & Phillips
Bradley eds., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1838); see also Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 21, at 663
("Education... was usually administered by the clergy and combined with religious instruction.").69 See 1983 CODE c.669, §1 (Canon Law Society of America trans. 1983) ("Religious are to wear
the habit of the institute made according to the norm of proper law as a sign of their consecration and as
a testimony of poverty.").
70 Hysong v. Sch. Dist. of Gallitzin, 30 A. 482, 484 (Pa. 1894).
71 Act of June 27, 1895, No. 282, 1895 Pa. Laws 395 (codified as amended at 24 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 11-1112 (West 1992)).
72 Several recent courts have found this as a legal matter. See, e.g., United States v. Bd. of Educ.
for Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 87-2842, 1989 WL 52506, at *10 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 1989) (concluding that
"anti-Catholicism was a significant factor in the passage of the Pennsylvania religious garb bill of
1895"); see also United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882, 893-94 (3d Cir.
1990) (agreeing with this conclusion).
73 See Commonwealth v. Herr, 78 A. 68, 73 (Pa. 1910).
74 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-898 (2008) ("Any teacher in any public school in this state who
wears, in such school or while engaged in the performance of his or her duty, any dress or garb
indicating the fact that such teacher is a member or an adherent of any religious order, sect, or
denomination, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .... "); OR. REV. STAT. § 342.650 (2009)
(similar); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 11-1112 (West 1992) (similar); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-29 (1991)
(similar) (repealed 1998).
75 See Knowlton v. Baumhover, 166 N.W. 202, 210 (Iowa 1918).
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state and local education boards barred religious garb on their own.7 6 By
1946, the National Education Association concluded that thirty-eight states
prohibited public school teachers from wearing religious garb.77 And there
was no doubt that many of these prohibitions were prompted by a
disturbing sort of anti-Catholicism. Early courts simply could not hide
their distaste for Catholics-consider what one New York court said about
Roman Catholic nuns serving as public school teachers:
It seems to us these sisters should never be permitted to
teach in our public schools. From the very nature of their
vows and lives, they should not be permitted to have the
care and instruction of young persons, without the free
consent of their parents. Catholics may consent to it.
Protestants will not and do not consent to it.
78
Similar stories abound elsewhere.79 Of course, a sympathetic modem
reader might see these prohibitions on religious garb as legitimate-not as
a way of stopping Catholicism, but as a way of stopping teachers from
pushing any sort of religion on their students.80 But such a reading is far
too generous to history. For the nineteenth-century legislators and judges
who created these restrictions on religious garb, it was clearly Catholicism
that was the threat. One state supreme court decision from the era, for
example, barred Catholic nuns from wearing religious garb in the public
schools, but then immediately went on to reaffirm that Protestant religious
exercises (including the saying of the Lord's Prayer and the reading of
Scripture from the King James Bible) were nevertheless still appropriate. 81
76 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Hendrick, 77 N.E. 612, 613-14 (N.Y. 1906) (upholding an executive
order by the state superintendent of public education prohibiting teachers from wearing the "distinctive
dress of the Roman Catholic religious order known as the 'Sisterhood of St. Joseph"').
71 See NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, THE STATE AND SECTARIAN EDUCATION 11 (1946);
see also LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 497, 774 nn.30-31 (2d ed. 1967) (reporting
same). Anson Phelps Stokes estimated that there were thirty-five states forbidding teachers from
wearing religious garb. See 2 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
590 (1950) ("In some states-now about fifteen-nuns wearing their religious garb are permitted as
public-school teachers.").
78 See O'Connor v. Hendrick, 96 N.Y.S. 161, 169 (App. Div. 1905), af'd, 77 N.E. 612 (N.Y.
1906).
79 See Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist., 723 P.2d 298, 308 (Or. 1986) (explaining that Oregon's
religious garb statute also comes "from the period of anti-Catholic intolerance"); 2 STOKES, supra note
77, at 590, 790 n.292 (explaining a number of similar incidents in a variety of states, including a
poignant one from North Dakota).
8o See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Free Will, Religious Liberty, and a Partial Defense of the French
Approach to Religious Expression in Public Schools, 42 HOuS. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (2005) (arguing that
prohibitions on religious garb are needed to prevent teachers from endorsing religion to their students).
81 See Knowlton v. Baumbover, 166 N.W. 202, 212 (Iowa 1918) ("Nothing in this opinion is to be
construed as a departure from the decision of this court in Moore v. Monroe... [which] permitt[ed] the
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Only a particular fear of Catholicism-rather than a general fear of state-
imposed religion-can explain this asymmetry.
This brings us to the case of Kimberlie Webb, a practicing Muslim,
who had been employed by the City of Philadelphia as a police officer.82
Webb sought permission to wear a traditional Muslim veil, known as the
khimar, while at work. Webb's khimar would have covered the back of
her head, slight parts of her forehead, and the sides of her face-although
the khimar itself would have been largely covered up by Webb's standard-
issue police shirt and hat.84
But the City of Philadelphia had a rule, known as Directive 78, which
permitted only certain kinds of clothes on the job. And while Directive 78
allowed certain scarves to be worn, the Police Department interpreted it as
forbidding the khimar.85 The Third Circuit ultimately upheld the Directive
and dismissed Webb's claim. While the khimar did not interfere with any
particular part of Webb's job, the Third Circuit nevertheless concluded that
the khimar could properly be banned in order to maintain the police
department's religious neutrality.86
Kimberlie Webb's story is only a slight variation on that of nineteenth-
century Catholic priests and nuns, who were similarly excluded from
public employment because of their commitment to wearing religious
clothing. Indeed, the two narratives are not just similar; they are
historically connected as well. Remember that Webb was bringing suit in
Philadelphia. And the state of Pennsylvania still had (and still has) the
garb statute enacted back in 1895 to exclude nuns and priests from the
public schools.87 This ancient statute became a central part of the
argument against Webb--given that Pennsylvania had long barred
religious garb from its public schools, the Police Department argued, it
made sense that state police departments would also bar it.88 Indeed, in the
actual court decisions, both the district court and the Third Circuit cite
Pennsylvania's garb statute in their denial of Webb's claim.89 This then
teacher of a public school to include in the daily exercises of such school the reading of the Scriptures
and recitation of the Lord's Prayer.").
82 Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 258 (3d Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Webb 11].
83 id.
84 id.
851d. at258 &n.1.
86 Id. at 261-62.
87 Act of June 27, 1895, No. 282, 1895 Pa. Laws 395 (codified as amended at 24 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 11-1112 (West 1992)).
88 See Defendant's Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment at 17 n.14, Webb v. City of
Phila., Civ. A. No. 05-5238, 2007 WL 1866763 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2007), 2007 WL 1155604
[hereinafter Webb 1] (discussing the Garb Statute of 1895); see also Defendant's Reply Brief in Support
of Its Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Webb 1, 2007 WL 1866763 (No. 05-5238),
2007 WL 1742185 (same).
89 Webb I, 562 F.3d at 259-60 n.3; Webb 1, 2007 WL 1866763, at *3.
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provides a perfect demonstration of how injustices can become routinized
and socially invisible; the unfair treatment of nuns and priests over a
hundred years ago becomes precedent (and therefore justification) for
similar treatment of Muslims today. Nowhere in the opinion does the
Court address the costs that its decision will have on religious believers
like Kimberlie Webb. Going forward, Webb seems to mean that those who
insist on wearing religious garb-Jews who seek to wear a yarmulke,
Muslims who want to wear a khimar, Christians who wish to wear a cross
or rosary-are all properly barred from governmental employment. And in
the areas of education and law enforcement, where government is the
largest or only provider of services, this means that religious believers may
have to go unemployed or change their line of work. What was true for
priests and nuns in the nineteenth century has now become true for
observant Muslims in the twenty-first; they will sometimes be able to
follow the dictates of their religion only at the cost of their jobs.
V. SIMPSON V. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
The final connection between modem church-state disputes and
nineteenth-century anti-Catholicism takes us away from public schools
altogether and into the realm of legislative prayer. Legislative prayer has a
long history in this country--one of the very first acts of the first Congress
was to hire chaplains.90 Almost thirty years ago, the Supreme Court held
that legislative prayer did not generally violate the Establishment Clause,
which left state and local governments generally free to open their sessions
with prayer.91  But legislative prayer has also sometimes created
contentious issues.92 One of them has been over which groups will have
the right to pray on behalf of the government. This issue divided Catholics
and Protestants in the nineteenth century; it divides us still.
Consider the case of Charles Constantine Pise, a Catholic priest in the
early nineteenth century. Pise had close relationships with a number of
influential politicians. Those relationships led, in 1832, to his becoming
the first Roman Catholic chaplain in the United States Congress. 93 No
Catholic had ever been a federal chaplain before, either in the Armed
Forces or in Congress.94 And Pise quickly came under attack from groups
90 See Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 17, § 4, 1 Stat. 70, 71 ("And be it further enacted, That there shall
be allowed to each chaplain of Congress, at the rate of five hundred dollars per annum during the
session of Congress .... ").
91 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
92 For more on legislative prayer generally and the issues it creates, see Christopher C. Lund,
Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972 (2010).
93 See M. Eulalia Teresa Moffatt, Charles Constantine Pise (1801-1866), in 20 HISTORICAL
RECORDS AND STUDIES 64, 79-80 (United States Catholic Historical Society ed., 1931); MILDRED
AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20427, HOUSE AND SENATE CHAPLAINS 1 (2008).
94 See Moffatt, supra note 93, at 79.
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of Nativist Protestants-one biographer wrote of the "intense anti-Catholic
feeling and bigotry [in] press and pulpit . . . alike" at the time of Pise's
nomination, and described how "[t]he thought of a Catholic priest holding
such a position of honor in the Senate of the United States called forth
strenuous efforts to prevent this 'disaster' to the Republic." 95 Shortly after
Pise's election, Protestant chaplains in state legislatures refused to offer
prayers in apparent protest,96 and Congress began receiving petitions
seeking to end Congress's chaplaincies altogether.97 On July 4, 1833, Pise
addressed the forces attacking him:
[W]as it not circulated through the press, as an argument
against my election to the Chaplaincy of the Senate, that I
am a subject of the Pope; that I had made an oath of
allegiance to him as a temporal lord ... Shall I contradict
all these assertions? ... [I declare that] I acknowledge no
allegiance to [the Pope's] temporal power-I am no
subject of his dominions-I have sworn no fealty to his
throne-but I am, as all Americans glory to be,
independent of all foreign temporal authority--devoted to
freedom, to unqualified toleration, to republican
institutions. America is our country; her laws are our
safeguard ... 98
Pise ended up leaving office in December 1833, serving one day short
of a year and leaving it ultimately unclear whether anti-Catholicism
contributed to his departure. But it is clear that, after Pise, anti-
Catholicism became a great force with regard to the chaplaincies.
Protestants began to oppose the chaplaincies precisely because they feared
that they might fall again into Catholic hands. Congressmen complained
that the chaplaincies "place us upon a level with the priest ridden
despotisms of the Old World" and they objected to Catholic priests
"promulgating [their] sectarian views" while on government salaries. 99
Many feared Catholicism's quick growth in this country-given the "rapid
strides of priestcraft, now being made in these United States," it would be
better to abandon the chaplaincies altogether than for them to be
95 See Moffatt, supra note 93, at 79; see also Charles Constantine Pise, in 14 DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 634 (Dumas Malone ed., 1934) (noting that Pise was "duly elected.., despite
an intense nativist opposition in press and pulpit to his creed and foreign honors").
9 See, e.g., THE GETTYSBURG STAR & REPUBLICAN BANNER, Jan. 1, 1833, at 3.
97 See, e.g., THE GETTYSBURG STAR & REPUBLICAN BANNER, May 20, 1833, at 2.
98 The magazine editors reporting the address remarked at being "struck with this passage."
ADAMS SENTINEL (Gettysburg, Pa.), Aug. 12, 1833, at 3.
99 See CONG. GLOBE, 35TH CONG., I ST SESS. 25-26 (1857) (recitation of a remonstrance by Rep.
Jones).
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maintained only to eventually fall into Catholic hands. 00 And these
concerns about Catholic chaplains continued for generations. Perhaps the
most amazing fact is that it was not until the year 2000-166 years after
Pise left office-that Congress elected another Catholic as a congressional
chaplain. l '
Compare Pise's experience with that of Cynthia Simpson. 10 2 Cynthia
Simpson was a Wiccan woman living in Chesterfield County, Virginia.
The County had a decades-long tradition of opening meetings of its Board
of Supervisors with a prayer. 0 3 The County Clerk sent a letter to local
congregations, inviting their clergy to come offer prayers on a first-come,
first-served basis. Simpson contacted the clerk, explained that she was a
clergyperson in the Wiccan faith, and asked for her turn. The Board wrote
back to Simpson, explaining that it would not allow her to offer a prayer:
Chesterfield's non-sectarian invocations are traditionally
made to a divinity that is consistent with the Judeo-
Christian tradition. Based upon our review of Wicca, it is
neo-pagan and invokes polytheistic, pre-Christian deities.
Accordingly, we cannot honor your request to be included
on the list of religious leaders that are invited to provide
invocations at the meetings of the Board of Supervisors.'04
In response, Simpson filed suit, claiming that she was the victim of
unconstitutional religious discrimination. But the Fourth Circuit rejected
her claim. The court explained that Chesterfield County's policy had been
fairly inclusive-while the vast majority of the prayer-givers were
Christian, it was also true that most of the people in the county were
Christian. And at least some religious minorities were represented-there
was evidence that at least one Jewish rabbi and one Muslim imam had also
delivered invocations. This, the Fourth Circuit explained, was a sufficient
demonstration of inclusivity: "It would, of course, be possible for any court
to pick fault with any elected body's selection of clergy."' 10 5
Little separates what happened to Charles Constantine Pise from what
happened to Cynthia Simpson, apart from their different religions and time
0 KEHUKEE PRIMITIVE BAPTIST ASS'N IN NORTH CAROLINA, MEMORIAL, S. MISC. Doc. No. 30-
2, at 1 (1848).
'0' Even in that election, there were allegations of anti-Catholicism. For more on this point, see
Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1171, 1191-93
(2009).
102 Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty., 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Simpson 11]; Simpson
v. Chesterfield Cnty., 292 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2003) [hereinafter Simpson 1].
103 Simpson 11, 404 F.3d at 278.
104 Simpson 1, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
105 Simpson 11, 404 F.3d at 286.
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periods. Protestants doubted that Pise was a proper religious role model
for the country because of his Roman Catholicism. Objecting to his
religion, they naturally objected to him giving prayers on behalf of
Congress. Precisely the same is true for Cynthia Simpson. The
Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors doubted her ability to act as a
proper religious role model because of her Wiccan beliefs. Objecting to
her religion, they understandably objected to her giving prayers on behalf
of the board. 10 6 Both Pise and Simpson faced exclusion from public life
for having religious views beyond the boundary of religious tolerance in
their time. What was true about our first three examples is true here as
well-the religious affiliations of the various factions have changed, but
the underlying issues are really the same.
VI. CONCLUSION
On the surface, our twentieth and twenty-first century struggles with
religious diversity appear to be unique tests of our social fabric. But they
are not unique. In many respects, they are mere repeats of the struggles of
earlier generations. Just as Catholicism tested the Protestant consensus of
the nineteenth century, other religions (like Islam and atheism) now test
our modem religious consensus. In some sense, the circle has expanded.
Our inclusion of Catholics now is something that would have been found
preposterous in an earlier age. But perhaps our inclusivity is really just a
by-product of our greater exclusivity. Maybe it is just an attempt to close
ranks on those we find even more foreign and dangerous, just as the
Protestants of old only began to accept each other when they recognized a
common enemy in Catholicism.
We have much to learn from the nineteenth-century episodes between
Catholics and Protestants. We have yet to realize the lessons of these
episodes, let alone begun to change our ways in light of those realizations.
The losses are tragic now, as they were a century ago. Mark Twain is
reputed to have once said that history does not repeat itself, but it
rhymes. 10 7  Listening to our history will hopefully help us hear the
injustices of the present and, perhaps, aid us in correcting them.
10 One board member called Wicca "a mockery" and said it was "not any religion I would
subscribe to." Id. at 285-86 n.4. Another board member, in referring to Simpson, remarked, "I hope
she's a good witch like Glenda," and added, "[tihere is always Halloween." Id. The Fourth Circuit
concluded that these "ill-advised remarks do not override the fact that the County seriously considered
Simpson's request and, as described at length herein, adopted an indisputably broad and inclusive
legislative invocation practice." Id.
107 Letter to the Editor, History's History, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1988.
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